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Abstract
The Great War was marked on the western front mainly by a war of position (for 40 
out of the 51 months of the conflict) along the 750 km of the front area from Flanders 
to Alsace. The objective of this article is to understand the spatial organisation of 
defence networks in the eastern part of the Champagne region (Champagne sèche), 
the Vallage d’Aisne and in the Argonne region in 1918 by means of an analysis of 
geographical information system (GIS)-processed trench maps. This article presents 
a methodology, involving the transfer of fire trenches, communication trenches and 
vegetation, integrated into a geodatabase, and then cross-referenced with the digital 
terrain model (DTM). This comparison of three distinct regions with a chalky plateau 
(Champagne sèche), a wet plain (Vallage d’Aisne) and a sandy plateau covered with 
forests (Argonne), not only makes it possible to qualify the role of geographical 
conditions on the Great War but also to quantify the defence networks.
Key words: WW1, trench map, GIS, spatial analysis, Champagne sèche, Vallage 
d’Aisne, Argonne.
Introduction
During the recent Centenary of the Great War and in the last century, numerous 
publications, research reports and studies were published, mainly about historical and 
social aspects of the Champagne1 and Argonne regions2. Over the past twenty years, 
new multidisciplinary research has focused on the archaeology of the Great War3, 
bringing together historians, geographers, archaeologists and geo-archaeologists, 
with the innovative scientific support of archaeometry4. The spatial aspect, previously 
confined to the successive battles of the conflict5, makes the terrain the focal point, 
which constitutes not only a real experimental laboratory for researchers6  but also an 
excellent potential for cultural heritage7.
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The need for spatial and historical contextualisation of the studied sites raises the 
recurrent problem of the impact of geographical conditions on the spatial organisation 
of the front8, an approach facilitated by the geographical information systems (GIS). 
To understand the spatial approach of the front, numerous and diverse sources need 
to be assessed: the writings and illustrations of soldiers, the military instruction 
manuals, aerial photographs9 and the trench maps all provide spatial information.10 
The study on which this article reports, aimed to understand the role of relief, geology 
and hydrography in structuring the front of the Great War based on three contiguous 
but geomorphologically different regions (Champagne sèche, Vallage d’Aisne or 
Wet Champagne, and Argonne). Indeed, the front is too often represented as a line 
of deep ternary organisation, structured in positions, and lines of fire trenches and 
communication trenches.11
Geographical and historical background
Figure 1: Location map of the studied area and World War 1 (WW1) front line in 
the Champagne plain and the Argonne regions (hills). Both underlying geology and 
present-day topography are shown.
The study area covers 45 km of the front line in France, between Reims and 
Verdun. It is part of three natural regions: Champagne sèche, Vallage d’Aisne and 
Argonne (Figure 1).
The chalky or pungent Champagne region, also called Champagne sèche, is the 
reverse western side of the Coast of Champagne in the Upper Cretaceous Chalk 
(Upper Turonian of the Campanian). The cuesta has a rugged topography owing to 
the anaclinal tributaries on the left bank of the Aisne (Bionne River, Dormoise River, 
Tourbe River, Muette River) and tributary valleys that are generally dry because they 
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are periglacials. These ‘ravines’ separate promontories, spurs or salients or ‘hills’ 
whose shape evokes the fingers of a hand north of Massiges City (hence the name 
‘Hand of Massiges’, Figure 2) or ‘Viper’s Head’ further north that rises to 199 m at 
Têtu Hill. Each spur corresponds to a finger of the hand with from west to east, the 
false Thumb, the Thumb, the Index, the Medium and the Annular. If the spurs are 
fortified by several lines of trenches, the ravines under the fire remain poorly equipped 
in fire trenches and communication trenches. Their slopes are dug as underground 
galleries under the fingers of the Hand of Massiges. This site was the place of harsh 
fighting in September–October 1915 (2nd Champagne offensive) for the takeover by 
the 2nd French Army of the Hand of Massiges. The spurs of the Coast of Champagne 
provide many sites of major strategic interest, serving as points of support for the 
defence and observation devices for the adjustment of artillery fire. These spurs and 
the Hill of Champagne were covered with cultivated areas dominated by pine forests 
at the time.
Figure 2: Section of trench map of Cernay-en-Dormois (chalky Champagne region)  
in 1918 (personal collection). 
The wet Champagne region or Vallage d’Aisne constitutes the orthoclinal 
depression of the Coast of Champagne. To the east, in the soft formations of the lower 
Turonian (marly chalk), hydromorphic soils characterise this flat plain, drained by the 
Aisne River and its tributaries on the left bank (Bionne River, Tourbe River, Dormoise 
River). Without large forest massifs, it is cultivated, grazed and punctuated with 
isolated woods. This front stabilised in Champagne sèche and Vallage d’Aisne until the 
return of movement to the war in September 1918.
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The Argonne region forms the reverse of the Cenomanian (or Argonne) coast 
made comprising Albo-Cenomanian gaize, a porous, grey-green, siliceous sandstone, 
relatively soft and light (density between 1.4 and 1.54) resting on impermeable clays 
of the Albian (Gault clay).12 The Argonne region, is enclosed between the Aisne River 
to the west, and its tributary, the Aire River, to the east, which presents a southern 
course including numerous valleys and tributary ravines, named “barribans” by Léry 
in 1916:13
On all sides, in every direction, they are very narrow ravines, with steep sides. The 
locals call them “barribans”. They constitute an insurmountable obstacle to anyone 
who wishes, to walk in the woods, outside the paths.
These ravines incise the surface by intersecting the gaize and the underlying clays. 
They drain numerous streams fed by source lines and barred by water bodies, whose 
humidity is sustained by heavy annual precipitations (up to 1 200 mm in Châtel-
Chéhéry). This coast-oriented overall north–south forms a natural barrier or forest 
barrier14 with a command of about 100 m for an invader coming from the east. The 
forest cover, the lack of a wide communication channel and the segmentation of the 
coast by the ravines comprised a real brake on the progress of troops in this forest.
After advancing fast in August 1914 and retreating on high points, the German 
army entered the Argonne forest at the end of September 1914 to make the link 
between the front at Champagne and the Vauquois Hill before Verdun. The French 
army was already installed in the forest and resisted in front of the German advance, 
fixing the front in mid-October. Even though this front was secondary, the French 
army had to contain the enemy to avoid an overflow by the west of Verdun as well 
as to protect the railway line between Châlons-sur-Marne and Verdun. From the 
end of September 1914 to the end of July 1915, the German operations in Argonn, 
caused only a localised retreat of 1 km of the front in the wood of the Gruerie, Haute-
Chevauchée and in the sector of the Fille Morte. This French retreat is visualised by 
the presence of mine craters in the Harazée sector, illustrating the former front line 
of the sector. During this position warfare, the mine warfare dominated, making the 
Argonne a true example of the underground war. It was not until the September and 
October 1918 offensives that the Argonne front was active again. The French army to 
the west on the chalky area and the American army to the east in the valley of the Aire 
River were advancing more rapidly than the two divisions engaged in the Argonne 
forest. The Germans performed numerous ambushes in the forest and the front then 
encountered a salient towards the south. About 150 000 soldiers died on this 20 km of 
front during the four years of war.
Data collection and methodology
The trench maps are military maps representing the defence networks of the front 
during the Great War. Given the inadequacy of the ordnance survey map to the static 
and trench warfare15, the French Army Geographical Service created the Groupes des 
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Canevas de Tir (GCTA) whose status was officially authorised in January 191516. 
One of the missions of the GCTA was to provide maps of enemy defence networks 
and enemy artillery positions with a new planimetric grid, a new map projection 
(Lambert North War Area), a new levelling of altitudes, with three scales (1/20 000, 
1/10 000 and 1/5 000) and two colours: red for the allied organisations and blue 
for the German organisations.17 The GCTA worked on the basis of the information 
gathered by aerial observation (oblique and azimuthal photographs), sound tracking 
sections (SRS), terrestrial observation sections (SROT), topographic sections of army 
corps and division, and questioning of enemy prisoners. The production of trench 
maps varied between 1914 and 1918, from 6 000 to 4 460 000 copies. The German 
army would have produced 60 million. These are housed in the national, regional and 
departmental archives, but the majority are in the Defence Historical Service (Paris) 
and in private collections. They suffer of a great dispersion but have the advantage of 
concentrating a large amount of filtered and interpreted information by the GCTA18. 
The documents are richer in information than aerial photographs, which is why the 
present contribution proposes to use them to understand the spatial organisation of the 
front. They are also used and contextualised in their historical context, in the form of 
excerpts, in the Journal de Marche des Opérations (JMO) available online on the site 
of the French Ministry of Defense (Men’s Memory). 
The organisation of the front was studied before the Ludendorff offensives and 
the return of the movement warfare, using the six trench maps (Tahure, Cernay-en-
Dormois, Argonne Forest, Somme-Suippe, Valmy and Sainte-Ménéhould). After 
high-definition digitisation, they were geo-referenced in a GIS using existing and 
current databases (Scan 25, DB Topo with a resolution of 25 m). These 1/20 000 
military maps present the entire defence network of each camp, red for the Allied 
Army and blue for the German Army (Figure 2).
154
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 1, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-1-1229
Figure 3: Organisation for work
Each entity could then be digitised using the GIS tool in three categories (Figure 3):
 • point object: examples included observatory, artillery battery;
 • object of line type: examples included fire trench, communication trench, 
railways; and
 • object of type polygon: examples included strong point, cemetery, camps.
The built and forested areas were also digitised as a polygon to provide information 
on land use at the time. Additional details on the nature of the entity, its use and/or its 
toponym were incorporated into each object where such indications were available. 
Finally, to link defence networks and terrain, the database was crossed with the 25 m 
digital terrain model (DTM) (DB ALTI IGN). Morphometric indices were used in a 
spatial analysis of defence networks (minimum, maximum and average lengths, No 
Man’s Land area, linear density, and number of craters).
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Results and discussion
Figure 4: Map of defence network in Champagne sèche, Vallage d’Aisne and 
Argonne region (1918). Index to trench map: (1) Tahure, (2) Somme-Suippe, (3) 
Cernay-en-Dormois, (4) Valmy, (5) Forêt d’Argonne, and (6) Sainte-Ménéhould.
The front, represented as a line, was in reality an area of about 20 to 30 km, 
structured and hierarchised in terms of position. A position was structured with at 
least four trenches. On this front of about 45 km (representing 6% of the western 
front), 4 303 km of fire trenches and communication trenches were digitised, with 
a corresponding density of 95 km of fire trenches and communication trenches per 
kilometre of front. However, this number masks huge differences. While the Vallage 
d’Aisne and the Argonne regions had an average of 74 and 78 km of fire trenches and 
communication trenches per kilometre of front, the Champagne sèche region was 
densely fortified with 116 km (1.5 times that of the other two) of fire trenches and 
communication trenches per kilometre of front. This intensification can be explained 
both by the mobility of the front line (1st and 2nd battles of Champagne), and also 
by the strategic interest of this plain, which could accommodate large offensives. 
The Argonne region, with its forest environments, and the Vallage d’Aisne, with wet 
characteristics, were not appropriate sectors for attacks of great extent.
These defence networks (fire trenches and communication trenches) were 
organised in position, each consisting of several lines of trenches. In the Champagne 
sèche region, each camp had four positions. The Vallage d’Aisne and Argonne regions 
were better fortified by the French with five positions, while the Germans only had 
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three and two respectively. The average area of the No Man’s Land between the first 
lines of each army was similar in the Champagne sèche and in Argonne regions (158 
m on average). The proximity of the two camps allowed for the development of the 
mine warfare (59 mine craters recorded in the Champagne sèche region and 91 in the 
Argonne region). Mine warfare, which is an ancient technique of breaking open the 
rampart of a fortress, was well suited to position warfare. The military engineering 
dug a gallery network of large sections towards the enemy, with subsequent narrower 
branches ending in explosive chambers called ‘stoves’, where concentrated black 
powder or explosives (melinite, cheddite) were placed. The necessary charge was 
calculated according to the nature of the soil (whose resistance associated with the 
coefficient g was comparable to that of chalk and gaize, g = 2.25) and the expected 
result (diameter of the mine crater). The ‘mine systems’ ranged from one explosion 
to more than 500, as in the case of the village of Vauquois. In our study area, this 
insidious war was possible only in the narrow No Man’s Land – between 37 and 125 
m. 
SSW-NNE geological cross-sections were constructed across French and German 
defence networks, using DTM, and marked by a red or blue initial for each trench 
intersected (Figure 5).
In the Champagne sèche region, the landscape was uncovered. The trenches 
were dug in chalk ridges, protected from enemy eyes, which did not allow a clear 
distinction of the different positions. French and German armies dug up to 16 km/
km² of fire trenches and communication trenches in the first 500 m of contact with 
the No Man’s Land, or 160 m/ha. The first two positions of each camp were mixed 
up in the first 5 km, both for fear of an enemy attack and to reinforce positions, but 
also as a consequence of the French attackers leading to retaking lost positions (two 
Champagne battles in 1915). 
In the Vallage d’Aisne region, the three recovered positions of the French army 
were more widely spread out. This allowed more communication trenches in the 
defence and a lower trench density (74 km/km front). The first position was established 
on the banks of Tourbes River (hydrographic barrier). The second and third were in 
promontory positions (observation sites) in marly chalk east of the Bionne River. On 
the other hand, the German army, located in the plain, established its three positions 
on the southern edge of the Ville, Cernay and Autry woods (vegetal mask effect).
In Argonne, under forest cover, the French army built four distinct positions, 4 
to 5 km from each another. The first was adjacent to the No Man’s Land on the right 
bank of the Biesme River, while the other three were located in promontory positions 
on the left bank of the Biesme River (second position), the Fontaine Le Prêtre brook 
(third position) and the Sougniat (fourth position) respectively. On the other hand, the 
German army built an extraordinarily dense first position, aligning up to 14 lines of 
fire trenches about 4 kilometres deep (16 km/km²). A second discontinuous position 
was found at the top of the interfluve of the Bâtons River and the Charlevaux River 
4.2 km from the No Man’s Land area19. 
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Figure 5: Cross-section of the defence network in the Champagne (A–B), the 
Vallage d’Aisne (C–D) and the Argonne regions (E–F) with area density of trenches 
and the ratio of the communication trenches and fire trenches.
The ratio of communication trenches to fire trenches was close to 1 in the intra-
positions; therefore, with as many fire trenches as there were communication trenches 
(intra-position), whereas this ratio was 2 to 3 between the positions for the routing of 
the men and equipment (inter-positional communication trenches).
Therefore, the defence network was not spatially homogeneous because it was 
conditioned by the relief, nature of the terrain, hydrography and vegetation cover 
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that determined sites of observation (topographic peaks), fire (military peaks), and 
covered or masked (forest, blind spot) areas. Ranges between positions were also 
related to the artillery range. In the Champagne sèche region without forest cover, the 
defence network was visible and spread out for protection from artillery impacts. It 
remained thick because it was fixed on chalk ridges, which constituted defence and 
observation sites. In the Vallage d’Aisne region, the hydromorphy limited the thickness 
of networks, and the flatness caused spreading out of the defence network. Finally, in 
the Argonne region, the forest cover smoothed the relief effect and guaranteed visual 
protection against artillery. It involved an intense densification of defence networks 
that crystallised in first position on ridges (mine warfare).
Conclusion
The contribution of spatial analysis of the trench maps of the Groupes de Canevas 
de Tir is innovative because it finally makes it possible to quantify this front area by 
morphometric indices (linearity, density, thickness). Too often represented as a line, the 
area was structured into positions comprising trench lines whose spatial organisation 
depended on the geomorphological, hydrographic and vegetation conditions, but also 
on the ballistic conditions (range of fire). The cleared plains (chalky Champagne) 
were conducive to large infantry attacks, while the hierarchisation of relief undeniably 
structured the curtains of defence. The front stretched out for almost 40 km. In wetland 
(Vallage d’Aisne) and under forest in the Argonne plateau, the hydromorphy of the 
soil and the forest cover considerably smoothed the effect of the relief and constituted 
a major constraint for the progress of the troops. This resulted in a lower density 
of defence networks. The spatial analysis is therefore promising because it finally 
makes it possible to quantify by morphometric indices. This highlights the association 
between the war and geography.
Use of airborne LiDAR20 shows that landform conservation of defence networks is 
greatly influenced by landscape changes since 1919, with vegetation cover dependent 
on agricultural and forestry practices that have attenuated or even levelled them. In 
the Champagne sèche region, all of these ‘polemo-forms’ have been levelled for re-
cultivation on chalky soils providing very good agricultural yield. However, 13,500 ha 
retained most of the impacts of this war because of the presence of the military 
camp of Suippes, which has become a real conservation area of the morphologies 
of the Great War. These forms are also best preserved in the woods and forest of 
the Vallage d’Aisne region and in the Argonne forest even though they have been 
affected by partial infilling over the last 100 years21. In some forest areas, they have 
been fully filled after restocking and harvesting. In addition, there is the problem 
of their disappearance in the next centuries. Associations, such as Sommepy-Tahure, 
Cote 108, Main de Massiges and Vauquois are participating in and contributing to the 
memory and remembrance work by maintaining and enhancing these cultural heritage 
sites.
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